Baby Thatcher Verhofstadt: “The weak position of the EU makes me sick”


Verhofstadt on Libya: “The weak position of the EU makes me sick”


Today at a meeting in Parliament to assess the results of last week's European Council, Guy Verhofstadt denounced the inability of the EU to take decisive action on the Libyan crisis. "This makes me sick," he declared.

"I want to use this opportunity to salute the fifty heroes, the fifty heroes in the power plant of Fukushima, the fifty heroes who at this very moment risk their life in order to save the people of Japan from a nuclear catastrophe. But Japan, for all its tragedy, is an event we cannot change. We can help. We must help. But unfortunately we cannot change.

"In Libya on the contrary we can change the course of events.  In Libya there are heroes as well. Thousands of them. Sacrificing their life for nothing else then freedom and democracy.  And what are we doing in order to prevent this? What are we doing to prevent what is in fact a new Srebrenica, a new Rwanda, a new Darfur?  Are we helping them? Defending them? Supporting them with arms or a no fly zone? Are we recognizing the opposition government? Are we trying to keep the democratic revolution alive?  No, we are sending fact finding missions".

"Have we learnt nothing from the past? It is now or never".



Verhofstadt and the 'federal European superstate':


Belgium’s ‘Baby Thatcher’ caught in tussle over top EU job:


‘Baby Thatcher’ returns as Belgian PM:


Blair backs ‘Baby Thatcher’ for Commission:



Washington Post: war propaganda, disinformation, censorship


According to veteran journalist Greg Mitchell, The Washington Post yanked a story of his that he was commissioned to write about failures in the news media in the lead up to the Iraq War. His piece made the obviously true argument that the media not only failed to question the war propaganda, but actively served as a bullhorn for the pro-war crowd.

Instead of running Mitchell’s story that was critical of the paper and the broader media, the Post instead ran a piece by Paul Farhi defending the media’s coverage.

Mitchell explains at his blog:

The Washington Post killed my assigned piece for its Outlook section this weekend which mainly covered media failures re: Iraq and the current refusal to come to grips with that (the subject of my latest book)–yet they ran this misleading, cherry-picking, piece by Paul Farhi claiming the media “didn’t fail.”  I love the line about the Post in March 2003 carrying some skeptical pieces just days before the war started: “Perhaps it was too late by then. But this doesn’t sound like failure.”

Here’s my rejected piece.  I see that the Post is now defending killing the article because it didn’t offer sufficient “broader analytical points or insights.”  I’ll let you consider if that’s true and why they might have rejected it.

Now let’s revisit my recent posts here on when probe in the Post itself by Howard Kurtz in 2004 showed that it failed big time.  For one thing, Kurtz tallied more than 140 front-page Post stories “that focused heavily on administration rhetoric against Iraq”–with all but a few of those questioning the evidence buried inside.  Editors there killed, delayed or buried key pieces by Ricks, Walter Pincus, Dana Priest and others.  The Post‘s David Ignatius went so far as offering an apology to readers this week for his own failures.  Also consider Bob Woodward’s reflections here and here.   He admitted he had become a willing part of the the “groupthink” that accepted faulty intelligence on the WMDs.

Woodward, shaming himself and his paper, once said it was risky for journalists to write anything that might look silly if WMD were ultimately found in Iraq.  Rather than look silly, they greased the path to war.   “There was an attitude among editors: Look, we’re going to war, why do we even worry about all the contrary stuff?” admitted the Post’s Pentagon correspondent Thomas Ricks in 2004.  And this classic from a top reporter, Karen DeYoung:  “We are inevitably the mouthpiece for whatever administration is in power.“  See my review, at the time, of how the Post fell (hook, line, and sinker) for Colin Powell’s fateful U.N. speech–and mocked critics.  Not a “fail”?



Syria is a victim of a global disinformation campaign

Germany.Lt. General I. Jurgen Bornemann.Military Representative to NATO.Germany) with General W. Schneiderhan.Chief of Defence,Germany..jpgThe geopolitical strategy of Nato seems a copy and an improvement of the plan of Nazi Germany...

From history

The New Order (German: Neuordnung) or the New Order of Europe (German: Neuordnung Europas) was the political order which Nazi Germany wanted to impose on Europe, and eventually the rest of the world. The establishment of the New Order was already begun long before the start of World War II, but was publicly proclaimed by Adolf Hitler in 1941: 'The year 1941 will be, I am convinced, the historical year of a great European New Order'.
Nazi Germany’s desire for aggressive territorial expansionism was one of the key triggers that led to the outbreak of World War II.
Historians are still divided as to its ultimate goals, some believing that it was to be limited to Nazi German domination of Europe, while others maintain that it was a springboard for eventual world conquest and the establishment of a world government under German control
“The Führer gave expression to his unshakable conviction that the Reich will be the master of all Europe. We shall yet have to engage in many fights, but these will undoubtedly lead to most wonderful victories. From there on the way to world domination is practically certain. Whoever dominates Europe will thereby assume the leadership of the world.”
Joseph Goebbels, 8 May 1943
The term Neuordnung originally had a different and more limited meaning than in its present usage. It is typically translated as New Order, but a more correct translation would actually be more akin to re-structurization. When it was used in Germany during the Third Reich-era it referred specifically to the Nazis' desire to essentially redraw the contemporary state borders within Europe, thereby changing the then-existing geopolitical structures.
Hitler’s ideas about eastward expansion that he promulgated in Mein Kampf were greatly influenced during his 1924 imprisonment by his contact with his geopolitical mentor Karl Haushofer.[11] One of Haushofer’s primary geopolitical concepts was the necessity for Germany to get control of the Eurasian Heartland in order for Germany to attain eventual world domination.
In a subsequently published speech given at Erlangen University in November 1930 Hitler explained to his audience that no other people had more of a right to fight for and attain "control" of the globe (Weltherrschaft, i.e. "world leadership", "world rule") than the Germans. He realized that this extremely ambitious goal could never be achieved without an enormous amount of fighting.[13] Hitler had alluded to future German world dominance even earlier in during his political career. In a letter written by Rudolf Hess to Walter Hewel in 1927, Hess paraphrases Hitler's vision: "World peace is certainly an ideal worth striving for; in Hitler's opinion it will be realizable only when one power, the racially best one, has attained complete and uncontested supremacy. That [power] can then provide a sort of world police, seeing to it at the same time that the most valuable race is guaranteed the necessary living space.
Hitler hoped to turn Germany into a total blockade-proof autarky by exploiting the vast resources lying in Soviet territories: the Ukraine was to provide grain, vegetable oil, feeding-stuffs, iron ore, nickel, manganese, coal, molybdenum; the Crimea natural rubber, citrus fruit and cotton; the Black Sea fish and the Caucasus crude oil.
The long-term objective as detailed by Hitler in Mein Kampf was the incorporation of large territories in Eastern Europe for German settlement, eventually expanding the territory of the Third Reich all the way to the Ural Mountains. Acquisition of settlement colonies in Eastern Europe would therefore solve the question of lebensraum.
Hitler's geopolitical thoughts about Africa always occupied a secondary position to his expansionist aims in Europe itself: "A colonial policy only makes sense if you first control the continent". His public announcements prior to outbreak of the war that Germany's former colonies be returned to it served primarily as bargaining chips to further territorial goals in Europe itself.
In 1940, the general staff of the German Navy produced a much more detailed plan accompanied by a map showing a proposed German colonial empire  in sub-Saharan Africa, extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean. The establishment of a vast colonial empire was to serve primarily economic purposes. The area included all pre-WWI German colonial territories in Africa, as well as additional parts of the French, Belgian and British colonial holdings in Africa.
A second part of the plan entailed the construction of a huge string of fortified naval and air bases for future operations against the Western hemisphere spanning much of the Atlantic coastline of Europe and Africa from Trondheim in Norway all the way up to the Belgian Congo, as well as many off-lying islands such as Cape Verde and the Azores. A less extensive but similar initiative was intended for the east coast of Africa.
In 1942, a secret diplomatic conference was held between Nazi Germany and the Japanese Empire in which they agreed to divide Asia along a line that followed the Yenisei River to the border of China, and then along the border of China and the Soviet Union, the northern and western borders of Afghanistan, and the border between Iran and India (what is now Pakistan was then part of India).
After the projected fall of the USSR, Hitler planned to intensify the war in the Mediterranean. The OKW produced studies concerning an attack against the Suez Canal through Turkey, an offensive towards Baghdad-Basra from the Caucasus (most of which was already under German occupation as a result of Fall Blau) in support of revolting Arab nationalists, and operations in Afghanistan and Iran directed against British India.
Turkey was favoured as a potential ally by Hitler because of its important strategic location on the boundaries of Europe, Asia, and Africa, as well as its extensive history as a state hostile against the Russian Empire as well as the later Soviet Union.
To assure that Germany wanted to work with them on a long-range basis, the Turks were guaranteed an equal status in the German-dominated order, and were promised a number of territories which they might desire for reasons of security. These encompassed Edirne (Adrianople) and a rectification of Turkish frontiers at the expense of Greece, the creation of buffer states in the Caucasus under Turkish influence, a rectification of the Turkish-Syrian frontier (the Baghdad Railway and the State of Aleppo) and the Turkish-Iraq frontier (the Mosul region), as well as a settlement of "the Aegean question" to provide Turkey with suitable protection against encroachments from Italy. The Black Sea (which Hitler derided as "a mere frog-pond")was also to be conceded to Turkey as part of its sphere of influence, for this would negate the need of stationing a German navy in the region to replace the Soviet Black Sea Fleet.
Allied-occupied Iran was also to be drawn into the Axis camp, possibly by the means of an uprising. The possibility of Iran as an anti-Soviet bastion was already considered in the 1930s, and coincided with Hitler's declaration of Iran as an "Aryan state" (the name Iran literally means "homeland of the Aryans" in Persian). The changing of Persia's name to Iran in 1935 was done by the Shah at the suggestion of the German ambassador to Iran as an act of "Aryan solidarity". On the eve of WWII Germany was already Iran's single-biggest trading partner, followed by the USSR, Britain, and the US.
During pre-war diplomatic maneuvers, the NSDAP Foreign Affairs Office took special interest in Afghanistan, believing that the Kaiserreich had failed to exploit the country diplomatically during the First World War despite the Niedermayer-Hentig Expedition. The objective was to ensure that the country would remain neutral during a possible German-British conflict, and even use it militarily against British India or Soviet Russia. Despite the NSDAP Foreign Office's good relations with the Afghan government, the Foreign Ministry under Ribbentrop favored overthrowing the current government and restoration of the rule of Amānullāh Khān, who had been living in exile since 1929.
After the German-French armistice of 1940, the Kabul government tried to question Berlin on German plans concerning the future of Afghanistan. Of special interest were the post-war borders of the country - the Afghan government hoped to see the "liberation" of 15 million ethnic Afghans living in British India, and the securing of the northern Afghan border so that an expansion towards the Indian Ocean became possible.
The Third Saudi State under Ibn Saud was seen as a natural ally, and was to be given territorial concessions in south-west Arabia and Transjordan. Also, a post-war satellite Greater Arab Union was discussed.
On February 17, 1945 Hitler explained to his entourage his regrets that Germany's prior alliance with its southern neighbour had prevented her from pursuing a 'more revolutionary' policy towards the Arab world, which would have also allowed its exit from the British and French spheres of influence in the area.

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Order_%28Nazism%29

Photo - Left to right: Lt. General I. Jurgen Bornemann (Military Representative to NATO, Germany) with General W. Schneiderhan (Chief of Defence, Germany)


German Chancellor Angela Merkel: 'Security must be assured in future too'


On October, 26th 2011, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and German Chancellor Angela Merkel addressed the media during a news conference after a meeting at the Chancellery in Berlin, Germany. Rasmussen said the alliance wanted to confirm a decision to end its operations in Libya by Oct. 31.  Rasmussen: 'The U.N.’s resolution adopted earlier in the day reflects that we have fully accomplished our mandate to protect the civilian population of Libya. Even though I do not foresee a major NATO role in Libya in the post-conflict period, if requested the alliance could assist the new Libyan government in the transformation to democracy, particularly in the areas of defense and security sector reforms'.